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Corporate Manslaughter and the 
Company Director 
 
Simon Daniels 
 
 
On the 6th April, 2008, long-awaited legislation came into force, 
which would change the face of corporate accountability for manslaughter. 
From sullen grumblings as far back as 1912 in the wake of the Titanic 
disaster, there has been growing concern that corporate manslaughter 
directly or indirectly threatens the security or well-being of society, and that 
it is not safe to leave it to be redressed only by compensation in civil 
proceedings. Following the failure of the prosecution of the shipowner in 
the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the call for a change in the law 
demanded action and, with the failure of the prosecution of Great Western 
Trains in the Southall crash, that call became irresistible.  
This paper examines the current law of manslaughter from the 
intimate position of the company director, and the rôle which they have 
played in the conception and birth of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
 
 
In his paper The Homicide Ladder in the Modern Law Review1, Victor 
Tadros states: 
 
When death is caused it is a natural reaction to look around for 
someone to blame... The fact that our intuitions in attributing 
blame for death tend not to track the wrongfulness of the 
killing very accurately provides a powerful reason for the law 
to differentiate between degrees of wrongdoing more 
precisely. In distinguishing between different levels of 
wrongdoing, the law provides public guidance about how we 
should perceive the killer where it is needed most, where our 
intuitions, particularly if we are bound up with the deceased, 
often fail us. 
 
                                                          
1
 V. Tadros, (2006) 69(4) MLR 601-618, at 601. 
The wrongdoing of manslaughter has historically proved particularly 
troublesome to establish with clarity, as described famously by Lord Atkin 
in Andrews v DPP2: 
  
Of all crimes manslaughter appears to afford most difficulties 
of definition, for it concerns homicide in so many and so 
varying conditions... the law ... recognises murder on the one 
hand based mainly, though not exclusively, on an intention to 
kill, and manslaughter on the other hand, based mainly, but 
not exclusively, on the absence of intent to kill, but with the 
presence of an element of 'unlawfulness' which is the elusive 
factor. 
 
There are two broad categories of involuntary manslaughter: 
manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, and manslaughter by gross 
negligence. In both cases, the crime must be addressed according to the 
elements which characterise it. When considering manslaughter by an 
unlawful and dangerous act, the mens rea, or mental element, is the intention 
to do that act and any fault required to render it unlawful. It is irrelevant that 
the accused is unaware that it is unlawful or that it is dangerous - the test is 
whether all sober and reasonable people recognise its danger3. 
Gross negligence manslaughter requires a slightly different test, to 
HVWDEOLVKZKHWKHUGHDWKRUVHULRXVLQMXU\IORZHGIURPWKHDFFXVHG¶VJURVV
negligence. A succession of cases over decades exposed the need to define 
MXVW KRZ HYLGHQFH RI WKH DFFXVHG¶V VWDWH RI PLQG VKRXOG XQGHUSLQ JURVV
negligence, until, in 1995, the case of R v Adomako4 established that the 
accused can be convicted of gross negligence manslaughter in the absence 
of evidence regarding his state of mind. Following Adomako, the jury needs 
to consider whether  
x the defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; and  
x he was in breach of that duty; and  
x the breach of duty was 'a substantial' cause of death5; and 
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 [1937] 2 All ER 552 (at 554-555). 
 
3
 DPP v Newbury [1977] 2 All ER 365. 
 
4
 [1995] 1 AC 171. 
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 As refined by R v O'Connor [1997] Crim LR p16 CA. 
 
x the breach was so grossly negligent that the accused can be deemed 
to have had such disregard for the life of the deceased that it should be 
seen as criminal and deserving of punishment by the state.  
 
In other words, the test must be objective. In the case of Williams v Natural 
Health Foods, Sir Patrick Russell stated6 
 
The touchstone of liability is not the state of mind of the defendant. 
An objective test means that the primary focus must be on things 
said or done by the defendant or on his behalf in dealings with the 
Plaintiff. Obviously, the impact of what a defendant says or does 
must be judged in the light of the relevant contextual scene. 
 
The decision in Adomako was not all the own work of the criminal justice 
system; however, in the absence of some alternative, persuasive authority in 
criminal law, it drew heavily on the case which defined the modern civil law 
of negligence. In Donoghue v Stevenson7 the task of defining the law fell to 
the House of Lords, which held after lengthy deliberation that, in making a 
claim for damages based on an allegation of another's negligence, the 
claimant must prove  
 
a) that the defendant, the party alleged to be negligent, had a duty to the 
injured party to avoid acts or omissions which might cause him loss or 
damage ± that is, the duty of care;  
 
b) that the defendant was in breach of that duty of care generally by showing 
that his conduct fell below the reasonably expected standard to be met by 
such persons in those circumstances; and 
 
c) the claimant must have suffered damage as a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant's breach of duty. 
  
The yawning gap between civil and criminal liability was, and remains, 
the burden of proving the essential elements: in civil proceedings, the 
claimant must establish their case on the balance of probabilities; in a 
criminal case, the prosecution must prove to the jury that all the elements of 
the crime have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This can very 
                                                          
6
 Williams and Another v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830. 
 
7
 [1932] All ER Rep 1; [1932] AC 562; HL. 
conveniently be illustrated in the recent case, R v Hubble8, in which the 
defendant, Second Officer on the P & O Ferry, Pride of Bilbao, pleaded not 
guilty to three counts of manslaughter, alleged to have taken place between 
the 20th and 24th August 2006. The prosecution had to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that, by his gross negligence, Mr Hubble, when officer of 
the watch, did not take sufficient steps to avoid the looming situation warned 
by the look-out, that he failed to proceed on the basis that there might have 
been a collision, and that he took no steps to stop or inform rescue services. 
As the evidence unfolded, negligence might have been established on the 
balance of probabilities, but not beyond reasonable doubt. The jury returned 
a verdict of not guilty. 
In the case of Mr Hubble, the verdict gave the accused cause to breathe 
a sigh of relief. The element of the yawning gap between civil and criminal 
liability in negligence, however, which gives growing cause for concern, 
was highlighted very starkly in the case of Captain Wolfgang Schröder. In 
March 2006, Captain Schröder was in command of the Zim Mexico III when 
she collided with a port-side crane at Mobile, Alabama. The consequence 
was the death of a dock-worker, following what mariners worldwide 
believed to be a mere error of judgment. Captain Schröder was indicted for 
homicide and the jury convicted him, and he faced a sentence of 
imprisonment of up to 16 months. At his sentencing, Judge Grenade noted 
that the law required jurors to find that Schröder was guilty of simple 
negligence, a lower standard more commonly associated with civil disputes. 
She concluded: ³While I certainly do not discount the terrible consequences 
that have resulted from this negligence, what he has been convicted of is 
really a civil offence.´9 
Judge Grenade accurately identified the weakness in determining guilt 
in a criminal trial according to the standards demanded of a law, the modern 
origins of which are founded on a claim for compensation arising out of a 
snail in a bottle of ginger beer. This appraisal surely underlines the wisdom 
of Sir Carleton Allen when he expressed his view of the purpose of the 
criminal law: 
 
Crime is crime because it consists in wrongdoing which directly 
and in serious degree threatens the security or well-being of 
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 [2007] The Crown Court Winchester (currently unreported). 
 
9
 United States of America v Wolfgang Schröder [2007] United States District Court, Alabama Southern District 
(currently unreported). 
 
society, and because it is not safe to leave it redressable only by 
compensation of the party injured.10  
 
Mimicking a scene from 7KH(PSHURU¶V1HZ&ORWKHVprecious little 
word of caution has followed the application of the civil principles of 
negligence through Adomako and 2¶&RQQRU to the criminal arena; but Judge 
Grenade may have articulated a new argument in this context. 
That said, having established the parameters of manslaughter by an 
individual under current law, let us put this in the context of the liability of 
a company director. In Ivory v Anderson11, Hardie Boys J expressed obiter 
that a director is not personally liable for the torts committed on behalf of 
WKHFRPSDQ\EHFDXVHRIWKHHIIHFWRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VVHSDUDWHH[LVWHQFHDQG
the doctrinal process by which the company acts. The decision in Williams 
v Natural Life Health Foods12 clarified the law that, in order to establish the 
personal liability of a director or employee, there had to have been such an 
assumption of personal responsibility by him as to create a special 
relationship between him and the claimant; that, in determining whether 
there had in law been such an assumption, an objective test was to be 
applied, the primary focus being on things done or said by the defendant or 
on his behalf and the question being whether the claimant could reasonably 
have relied, and had relied, on an assumption of personal responsibility by 
him. 
Until very recently, the assumption of personal responsibility implied 
an obligation arising out of consent, rather than one imposed by law, which 
Harrison argued, logically, must originate frRP WKHGLUHFWRU¶V FRQWUDFWRI
employment, requiring the physical undertaking of an obligation to 
undertake such steps as to observe a duty of care13. Indeed it was this upon 
which liability in criminal law turned for the directors of the owning 
company of the Herald of Free Enterprise.  
The background and the facts of this case demand some attention in 
depth.  The Herald of Free Enterprise was one of three sisters, a modern 
roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) passenger/vehicle ferry grossing 7,950 tons, and one 
of the largest vessels of her type when she left her German builders in 1980. 
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 6HH5*UDQWKDPDQG&5LFNHWWµ'LUHFWRUVDQG7RUWLRXV/LDELOLW\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
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,ndustrial Law 
Journal, 31-43.  
She had been designed at a time when her owners, Townsend Thoresen, 
knew that every second and every penny counted in the cut-throat 
competition on the English Channel. Indeed, so thorough had her design 
concept been, that the linkspans at either end of her planned service, 
between Dover and Calais, were especially built to match the levels of the 
VKLS¶VFDUGHFNVLQRUGHUWRHQDEOHVLPXOWDQHRXVORDGLQJRIERWKGHFNVDQG
thus minimise the time required for turn-around in port.  
The competition just carried on growing in the English Channel, one of 
the most crowded seaways in the world ± and the Dover-Calais run was the 
most competitive crossing, because it was the shortest ± just 22 miles long. 
:KLOH WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V 8.V¶¶V JURZLQJ WUDGH ZLWK WKH (XURSHDQ
Community undoubtedly contributed to the rising demand, competition was 
heating up, thanks to a number of factors. In July 1984 the UK Government 
announced the privatisation of the former State-owned ferry operator 
Sealink, which would exert yet more pressure on the competitiveness of the 
rival ferry operators on the route. Then, in 1986, after generations of aborted 
attempts to initiate a tunnel project, and in the face of bitter opposition from 
the ferry operators, the French and British governments finally gave the go-
ahead to build the Channel Tunnel.   
In the face of these factors, the board rooms of ferry operators had to 
consider how best to conduct their prime function: to maximise a yield for 
their investors. It was against this background that P & O European Ferries 
had to make some bold business decisions. As a short-sea shipping 
company, it had a hugely successful tradition, making the most of a 
subsidiary, the General Steam Navigation Company, which had been so 
successful in European trading that P & O had acquired the controlling 
interest in the Company and when, in the 1960s, the pattern of Channel 
business was evolving, P & O backed General Steam in a business venture 
which evolved into P & O European Ferries.   
By the summer of 1986, the board room of P & O Ferries was thinking 
hard about its long-term strategy in order to retain its position in the market-
place and satisfy the shareholders. This was the sum of the direFWRUV¶
concerns; safety management was not among their job descriptions. It was 
surely no coincidence that, at about this time, it resolved to buy out its rival, 
Townsend Thoresen, reducing the competition and spreading the overheads. 
In February of the following year the deal was completed and the directors 
of P & O Ferries implemented their plans for maximising the financial yield.  
Their own ferries on the Dover-Calais route were doing their job very 
VDWLVIDFWRULO\WKH\GLGQRWQHHG7RZQVHQG¶VWRQQDJHWhere, so it was decided 
to switch the Herald of Free Enterprise to the Zeebrugge route. The only 
problem was that the linkspans at Zeebrugge had not been designed with the 
Herald LQPLQGVRWKDWIRUWKHYHVVHO¶VXSSHUYHKLFOHGHFNWREHDFFHVVHG
by the ramp, it was necessary to trim the ship by the head and flood her 
ballast tanks to lower the level of the vehicle deck to the linkspan. 
When the Herald left Zeebrugge on the 6th March1987, not all the water 
had been pumped out of the bow ballast tanks, causing her to be some three 
feet down at the bow. Mr Stanley, the assistant bosun, was responsible for 
closing the bow doors but he had been released from duties by the bosun 
before the sailing time. He duly went to his cabin and fell asleep; tragically, 
he slHSWWKURXJKWKHµ+DUERXU6WDWLRQV¶FDOOZKLFKRUGHUHGWKHFUHZWRWKHLU
DVVLJQHGVDLOLQJSRVLWLRQV,WZDVQRWSDUWRIDQ\ERG\HOVH¶VGXWLHVWRHQVXUH
that the bow doors were closed before sailing, save the overriding duty of 
the Master to ensure that the vessel was in all respects safe to proceed to 
sea. Her design of her clamshell bow doors made it impossible for Captain 
David Lewry to see from the bridge if the doors were opened or closed, 
though. 
The Herald sailed at 7.05pm local time, with a crew of 80 and some 
459 passengers, 81 cars, three buses, and 47 trucks. Passing the outer mole 
19 minutes later, she increased speed, when a bow wave began to build up 
under her prow. At 15 knots, with the bow down three feet lower than 
normal, water began to break over the main car deck through the open doors 
at the rate of 200 tons per minute.  
In common with other ro-ro vessels, the +HUDOG¶Vmain vehicle deck 
lacked transverse bulkheads and, so, the sudden flood of water through the 
bow doors quickly caused the vessel to become unstable. The Herald listed 
30 degrees to port almost instantaneously, as water continued to pour in and 
fill the port wing of the vehicle deck, causing her to capsize 40 seconds later. 
The Herald settled on the sea bed at slightly more than 90 degrees with the 
starboard half of her hull above water. There had been no chance to launch 
DQ\RIWKHVKLS¶VOLIHERDWV 
At least 150 passengers and 38 members of the crew lost their lives 
when the vessel capsized, the worst peacetime disaster involving a British 
vessel since the sinking of the Titanic in 1912. In accordance with the 
provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act (at that time, the 1894 Act), a 
Formal Investigation was conducted by Mr Justice Sheen14, whose findings 
included inter alia; 
 
                                                          
14 mv HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE. Report of Court No. 8074, Formal Investigation (July 1987). 
 
At first sight the faults which led to this disaster were the aforesaid 
errors of omission on the part of the Master, the Chief Officer and 
the assistant bosun, and also the failure by Captain Kirby to issue 
and enforce clear orders. But a full investigation into the 
circumstances of the disaster leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that the underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company. 
The Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for 
the safe management of their ships. They did not apply their minds 
to the question: What orders should be given for the safety of our 
ships? The directors did not have any proper comprehension of 
what their duties were. There appears to have been a lack of 
thought about the way in which the Herald ought to have been 
organised for the Dover-Zeebrugge run.  
All concerned in management, from the members of the Board of 
Directors down to the junior superintendents, were guilty of fault 
in that all must be regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure 
of management. From top to bottom the body corporate was 
infected with the disease of sloppiness. 
 
While the judge criticised the directors in the most scathing terms 
possible (the final sentence in this quotation has not ceased to ring in the 
ears of ship operators ever since), the same words, paradoxically, became 
WKHGLUHFWRUV¶VDOYDWLRQ7KHIDFWWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHOHGWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDW
the directors had not appreciated their responsibility for the safe 
management of their ships, that they had not applied their minds to the 
question of safety and their lack of comprehension of what their duties were, 
showed that no director had assumed any personal responsibility which 
underpinned a duty of care and, in the absence of that, there could not be 
any realistic prospect of a conviction for manslaughter against a director. 
It has been this issue which has characterised the long catalogue of 
failed prosecutions for corporate manslaughter. The concept of corporate 
personality is often traced by modern authors to the decision in Saloman v 
Saloman15, but in fact, the existence of corporate personality has been traced 
back to ancient Rome. 16 The two essential features of a business, 
incorporated under law, are its independent legal personality, meaning that 
it can own property, sue and be sued in its own name; and the members' 
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16 ++DQVPDQQ5.UDDNPDQDQG56TXLUH¶/DZDQGWKH5LVHRIWKH)LUP·Harvard LR, 
1333, 1356-1364. 
liability is limited to the amount unpaid on shares held by them17. As a 
separate legal entity, it is the company which will be sued and, unless the 
director positively abandoned the shield of tKH FRPSDQ\¶V VHSDUDWH
personality, personal liability does not arise even where the director has 
physically committed the tortious act.18  
The test of whether a company is guilty of manslaughter or not has, 
until April 2008, been intrinsically linked to whether or not a director or 
senior manager of the company ± part of the 'controlling mind and will' of 
the company - is guilty of manslaughter. If the director is found guilty, the 
company is guilty; if the director is found not guilty, the company will be 
not guilty. This is known as the 'identification' doctrine, the test for which 
was described in HL Bolton v Grahams & Sons Ltd19:  
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has 
a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has 
hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions 
from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere 
servants and agents who are nothing more than the hand to do the 
work and cannot be said to represent the mind and will. Others are 
directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will 
of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of 
these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated 
by the law as such. 
There was, however, uncertainty about how this general test could be 
applied. In the House of Lords case, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass,20 
three different judges gave three slightly different interpretations of who 
could be defined in the controlling mind. Lord Reid stated that the following 
individuals were controlling minds of a company: the board of directors, the 
managing director and perhaps other superior officers of a company [who] 
carry out the functions of management and speak and act as the company. 
Viscount Dilhorne gave a more limited interpretation saying that a 
controlling mind is a person 
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 H Hansmann  & R Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? UHIHUUHGWRE\5*UDQWKDPLQµ7KH/LPLWHG
/LDELOLW\RI&RPSDQ\'LUHFWRUV¶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 Ibid. 
 
19
 [1957] 1 QB 159. 
 
20
 [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
 
 [w]ho is in actual control of the operations of a company or of part 
of them and who is not responsible to another person in the 
company for the manner in which he discharges his duties in the 
sense of being under his orders. 
Further, Lord Diplock stated that the people who are the controlling minds 
are those 
who by the memorandum and articles of association or as a result 
of action taken by the directors or by the company in general 
meeting pursuant to the articles are entrusted with the exercise of 
the powers of the company. 
Mr Justice Taylor had to wrestle with the concept of the controlling 
mind in the ensuing prosecution of P & O Ferries in the Herald case21, 
when he stated; 
Where a corporation, through the controlling mind of one of its 
agents, does an act which fulfils the pre-requisites for the crime of 
manslaughter, it is properly indictable for the crime of 
manslaughter. 
The prosecution was doomed to fail. After a half-time submission, the judge 
ruled that the prosecution was not in a position to satisfy the 'doctrine of 
identification'.  
This now established itself as the stumbling block for prosecutions in 
corporate manslaughter. In the trial of Great Western Trains22 over the 
Southall Train disaster, the Crown tried to argue that the doctrine no longer 
applied and that it was possible to consider the conduct of the 'company' as 
a whole rather than the conduct of an individual 'controlling mind'. The trial 
judge, however, ruled against him, and his decision was upheld by the Court 
of Appeal, stating that 23 µWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQSULQFLSOHUHPDLQVWKHRQO\EDVLV
LQFRPPRQODZIRUFRUSRUDWHOLDELOLW\IRUJURVVQHJOLJHQFHPDQVODXJKWHU¶ 
The Law Commission presented a report with recommendations, parts 
of which the Government embraced24, which culminated in the Corporate 
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 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd [1991] 93 Cr App R 72. 
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 R v Great Western Trains. See The Times, 3 July, 1999. 
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 Attorney General's Reference No 2/1999. 
 
24
 See Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government's Proposals (Home Office, May, 2000, 
CC NO77828), pp 30-36). 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which came into effect on 
the 6th April 2008. Section 1(1) defines the new offence, which, Parliament 
has emphasised, builds on key aspects of the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter; but it now abolishes the old requirement 
demanded by the identity doctrine and depends on a finding of gross 
negligence in the way in which the activities of the organisation are run. 
 
In summary, the offence is committed where, in particular 
circumstances, an organisation owes a duty to take reasonable care 
IRU D SHUVRQ¶V VDIHW\ DQG WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK DFWLYLWLHV RI WKH
organisation have been managed or organised amounts to a gross 
breach of that GXW\ DQG FDXVHV WKH SHUVRQ¶V GHDWK +RZ WKH
activities were managed or organised by senior management must 
be a substantial element of the gross breach.25 
 
Crucially, this Act is intended to pursue corporate accountability. 
Parliament did not intend that an individual be prosecuted under the Act 
and, hence, if an individual director is to be prosecuted, it will still be a 
common-law offence to answer - if necessary, in parallel with proceedings 
against the corporate entity under the statute. Of course, the success of the 
new Act in facilitating corporate convictions by circumventing the old 
identification doctrine remains to be tested. 
7KDWVDLGLWZLOOQRWEHORVWRQUHDGHUVWKDWWKHDXWKRUVWDWHGµ8QWLOYHU\
recently, the assumption of personal responsibility implied an obligation 
DULVLQJRXWRIFRQVHQW¶7KH&RPSDQLHV$FWKDVFKDQJHGVRPHZKDW
MXVW ZKDW FDQ EH LPSOLHG ZLWK FODULW\ LQ WKH GLUHFWRU¶V FRQWUDFW RI
employment, setting in stone on a statutory basis, the former common-law 
principles which had evolved through case law. Section 170 makes it very 
clear that a director owes to a company a number of general duties, as 
qualified in subsections 3 and 4: 
x The general duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable 
principles as they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place 
of those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company 
by a director. 
x The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as 
common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to 
                                                          
 
25
 Ministry of Justice Notes for Guidance, 2007. 
the corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in 
interpreting and applying the general duties. 
  
This must be applied to Section 174, which defines the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence: 
 
(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. 
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by 
a reasonably diligent person with- 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the 
director in relation to the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. 
 
,WWKHUHIRUHIROORZVWKDWWKHGLUHFWRU¶VGXWLHVKDYLQJEHHQFRGLILHGE\
statute, will, without doubt of any interpretation, be incorporated - at the 
very least as implied terms - into the contract of employment. The 
downstream consequences must be considered: 
 
1. The duty of care must logically extend to cover acts or omissions which 
could cause the company loss or damage.  
 
2. As a result, the scenario can well be envisaged in which a director may 
not be convicted of manslaughter but the company may be convicted under 
the 2007 Act as well as under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and 
its statutory instruments.  
 
In that case, a conviction under any such legislation may lead not only to 
dismissal but also to claims for compensation by the company. In view of 
the value to claimants under civil law, of a conviction which can be adduced 
in evidence of liability against the company, the new legislation raises the 
SURILOHRQFHDJDLQRIWKHGLUHFWRU¶VH[SRVXUHWRDFFRXQWDELOLW\XQGHUWKHLU
contract of employment, for the vicarious liability which they have thrust 
upon their employer by reason of their acts or omissions, as held obiter by 
Lord Thankerton in Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Lockhart26:   
 
                                                          
26
 [1942] AC 591. 
 
It is clear that the master is responsible for acts actually authorised 
by him: for liability would exist in this case, even if the relation 
between the parties was merely one of agency, and not one of 
VHUYLFHDWDOO%XWDPDVWHU«LVOLDEOHHYHQIRUDFWVZKLFKKHKDV
not authorized, provided they are so connected with acts which he 
has authorized that they may rightly be regarded as modes - 
although improper modes - of doing them.  
 
7KH$FWQRORQJHUOHDYHVWKHGLUHFWRU¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\WRWKHFRPSDQ\
in very much doubt and the spectre of Lister v Romford Ice looms large. In 
that case it was held that an employer may be liable in a claim for 
compensation under civil law for his employee's breach even though it 
constitutes a crime. Their Lordships qualified this in the context of the 
HPSOR\HH¶VFRQWUDFWXDOGXWLHVWKDWDWHUPZLOOQRWEHLPSOLHGLQWRDFRQWUDFW
at common law unless it satisfies the requirement of certainty, under the 
general principle that an implication must be precise and obvious27. The 
requirement of certainty has been satisfied by virtue of the provisions of 
Chapter 2 of the Act. 
Any conclusion on Corporate Manslaughter and the Company Director 
must focus on the management of risk. Of course, no commercial venture is 
risk-free, and the eternal truth of business management is that directors must 
balance the chances of an event occurring against the consequences of it 
occurring. After all, it is generally the high-risk scheme which attracts the 
investors: such schemes can collapse expensively but, if they succeed, they 
SURPLVH WKH JUHDWHVW UHZDUG WR WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VKDUHKROGHUV /LIH FDQ EH
much more complicated than that, of course, if the director is to keep the 
shareholders satisfied: consider the case of the Ford Pinto.  
The late 1960s were proving to be troubled times for the makers of large 
American motor cars, not least because of a looming global recession and 
the effect which crude prices had on the demand for motor cars in the United 
States. Manufacturers had to re-think their business strategies and plan for 
cars which satisfied the changing demand; failure to get the strategy right 
would inevitably result in declining market-share and a declining share price 
IRUWKHFRPSDQ\,WZDVRIFRXUVHWRSRIWKHOLVWRIWKHGLUHFWRUV¶GXWLHVWR
guard against such ills and so, in 1968, Ford approved the concept of their 
QHZµVXEFRPSDFW¶IDPLO\FDUWKH3LQWR,WZDVRQO\DIWHUWKHFompany was 
fully committed to production, though, that an engineer pointed out to them 
that the new design posed a serious risk in a collision, for the fuel 
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installation, crushed into such a confined space, presented a high risk of a 
fire which could kill or maim the occupants. 
The Ford directors did not panic, but calmly assessed the risk, and 
ordered a cost-benefit analysis. As a result, they were able to establish some 
forecasts which, admittedly, in the cold light of day, combine to draw a 
shocking picture of the consequences of making Board decisions without 
regard to ethical practices: 
 
x The Pinto would probably cause 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn 
injuries, and 2,100 burned vehicles, resulting in civil claims, based on 
the quantum of claims in contemporary cases, of $200,000 per death, 
$67,000 per injury, and $700 per vehicle, making a total of $49.5 
million.  
 
x On the other hand, the costs for installing safety features would cost 
some $11 per Pinto, which would give a total bill of some $137.5 
million.  
 
As a result, the directors took the management decision to tolerate the 
risk, which, based on the arguments in the cost-benefit analysis, of course 
made financial sense. It also satisfied the legal definition of recklessness, 
famously held by Lord Diplock, that a defendant is reckless when (1) he 
does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be 
destroyed or damaged; and (2) when he does the act he either has not given 
any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised 
that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it.28 
In May 1972, Mrs Gray was at the wheel of her six-month old Pinto in 
California, with 13-year old Robert Grimshaw as a passenger. As a result of 
a rear-end collision, Mrs Gray died from her injuries; Robert Gramshaw 
survived, but with shocking personal injuries, just as the engineer had 
predicted. At the trial of his civil claim against Ford29, the jury held against 
the company and awarded total damages exceeding $128 million, most of 
ZKLFKFRQVLVWHGRISXQLWLYHGDPDJHVWRUHIOHFWWKHMXU\¶VFRQGHPQDWLRQRI
WKHUHFNOHVVQHVVRIWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQ 
Although the quantum of punitive damages in the United States has 
been reduced dramatically by a succession of judicial decisions in recent 
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years, the core issue so relevant to this paper is clear: the management by 
directors of risk can be a crucial factor in determining whether the 
FRPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHGLQVXFKDZD\DVWRcause a 
SHUVRQ¶VGHDWKDPRXnting to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed 
by the company to the deceased. This mirrors the provisions of Section 1 of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
In conclusion, therefore, despite the statutory abandonment of the 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQ SULQFLSOH WKH GLUHFWRU KDV D SLYRWDO U{OH LQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
liability, for the way in which they manage the business of risk and, although 
the new Act does not extend personal accountability to the director, the very 
fact of their employment as a director can hold them accountable to the 
company by virtue of the provisions of the 2006 Act.    
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